Khruschev's Cold War is a well-researched, calmly argued revision of popular understandings of the Cold War during the critical period of the late 1950s/early 1960s. Fursenko and Naftali take advantage of recently accessed/released files from Russian archives, correcting previous calculations regarding Khruschev and the Soviet government's ideas, concerns, and positions with reference to actual meeting minutes, diary entries, and interviews. In particular, they convincingly portray Khruschev as near-obsessed with mitigating the military aspect of the Cold War in order to allow the already-strapped Soviet economy to concentrate on domestic needs. He is shown as idealistic about Eisenhower's and Kennedy's desire for co-existence with the Soviet Union, impulsive in his foreign policy decision making, and opportunistic with regards to the possibility of extending Soviet influence in the Third World. The best aspect of this book, as suggested above, is the use of previously unavailable Soviet archival records, which give an entirely new perspective on events such as the second Berlin crisis, the Suez crisis, the U2 crisis, and the Cuban missile crisis.
I have really only two complaints about this book. Firstly, it almost entirely skips over the fascinating removal of Khruschev from the leadership of the Soviet Union. While the topic doesn't necessarily fit neatly within the purpose of exploring his Cold War thinking, it's such a critical element of the man and the Soviet government's story for the period that it does seem an odd omission. Secondly, the (hardcover) version does suffer from sloppy editing (typos are rampant), but the quality of writing is good overall.
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